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CASENOTES

City of Boerne v. Flores: Defining the Limits
of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Clause Power

In City of Boerne v. Flores,' the United States Supreme Court held
that through the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA)' Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement
Clause Power. The Court invalidated the statute because of its
incongruence and its contradiction of vital principles necessary to
maintain the Separation of Powers doctrine.8
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

St. Peter Catholic Church is located in the city of Boerne, Texas,
approximately twenty-eight miles northwest of San Antonio. The church
was built in 1923 and replicates the mission style architecture of the
region's earlier history. St. Peter's seats about 230 worshipers, a
number too small to accommodate the growing parish. At some Sunday
masses, approximately forty to sixty parishioners could not be supplied
with seating. In order to meet the needs of the St. Peter's congregation,

1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (6-3 decision).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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the Archbishop of San Antonio, P.F. Flores, gave
permission to the
4
parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months after the Archbishop's approval for enlargement, the
Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic
Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed
historic landmarks and districts.5 Under this ordinance, the Commission must pre-approve construction affecting historic landmarks or
buildings in a historic district. Soon after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so that
construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities,
relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district (which
they argued included the church), denied the Archbishop's application."
The Archbishop brought suit under RFRA challenging the permit
denial7 in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas.8
Aware of the city's special constitutional issue, the district court
allowed both parties to submit briefs addressing the constitutionality of
RFRA.9 The district court held RFRA to be unconstitutional because it
"chang[ed] the burden of proof as established in Employment Division v.
Smith."'0 In addition, the court held that through the enactment of
RFRA Congress had exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The district court
certified its order for interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit. 2 The
United States and the church appealed and petitioned for leave to
appeal." The Fifth Circuit held that Section Five of the Fourteenth

4. Id. at 2160.
5. Id. The city enacted the ordinance in order to "protect, enhance and perpetuate
selected historic landmarks" and to "safeguard the City's historic and cultural heritage."
Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996).
6. Id. St. Peter's was not designated as a historic landmark, but at least part of the
church was included within the District. According to the Archbishop, the Historic District
included only the church's facade, but the city considered the entire structure to be within
the District. 73 F.3d at 1354.
7. 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
8. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
9. Id. at 356. The district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1994), certified the
question to the Attorney General of the United States. The Solicitor General subsequently
agreed to intervene on behalf of the United States of America, likewise submitting a reply
as plaintiff had done. Id.
10. Id. at 357-58 (citing Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
11. Id. at 357. "The court is cognizant of Congress' authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, yet is convinced of Congress' violation of the doctrine of
Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary." Id.
12. 73 F.3d at 1354.
13. Id
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Amendment empowered Congress to enact RFRA." The court also held
that RFRA did not violate the Separation of Powers doctrine by usurping
the judiciary's power D interpret the Constitution and reversed the
decision of the district court.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 6 reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, and held that by enacting
its enforcement power under the
RFRA, Congress had exceeded
17
Fourteenth Amendment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 as a legislative
response to Employment Division v. Smith.' Under Smith, the First
Amendment no longer protected religious practices that conflicted with
"valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability."' 9 The Court held
that the Constitution's Free Exercise Clause "does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). '" ° The
majority declined to examine whether the denial of a religious exemption, which prohibited Oregon Native Americans from ingesting peyote
to the achievement of a
for sacramental purposes, was necessary
21
compelling governmental interest.

The compelling interest standard had been articulated in numerous
cases since Sherbert v. Verner.2 2 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court
established a three part test for evaluating Free Exercise claims. If (1)
the religious observer could show a sincerely held religious belief that
was substantially burdened by some government rule or regulation, then
(2) the government had to demonstrate a compelling interest in passing
the rule or regulation, and (3) such regulation must be the least
restrictive means available to achieve the compelling governmental

14. Id. at 1364.
15. Id. at 1364-65.
16. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
17. 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
18. Id. at 2160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 890
(finding there is no First Amendment protection of religious practices that conflict with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability; denying Native Americans unemployment
benefits because they were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes)).
19. 494 U.S. at 879.
20. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
21. Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 34
(Spring 1997).
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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interest. 2' This three part analysis served as the standard for interpreting the Free Exercise Clause for nearly three decades.
The purpose of RFRA was "to restore the compelling interest test set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin u. Yoder," and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion was substantially burdened.'
Additionally, RFRA served as a vehicle to provide
"claim[s] or defense[s] to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.'
The statute protected the free exercise
of religion by establishing the burden the government must meet in
order for laws affecting such free exercise to withstand judicial scrutiny.
The government could burden a person's free exercise of religion (even
if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability) 7 only if it
demonstrated that the application of the burden to the person was in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. 28 RFRA was not to be
construed as authorizing the federal or state governments to burden any
religious belief, nor as affecting in any way the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.2
Congress's reinstatement of the Sherbert standard had been examined
on constitutional grounds by lower federal courts prior to City ofBoerne.
These courts examined the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to stateimposed burdens on the exercise of religion and reached different
conclusions.' Some district courts upheld RFRA on either remedial
grounds by approving of Congress's power to enact corrective legislation,
or substantive grounds by recognizing Congress's ability to disagree with
the Court on the reach of Constitutional rights." Two district courts,
however, held RFRA unconstitutional.3 2 These cases centered around
concerns about Congress's power to create religious exemptions to state
legislation. Thus, the constitutionality of RFRA would rest on the

23. Id. at 403.
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(bXl).
26. Id § 2000bb(bX2).
27. Id. § 2000bb-l(a).
28. Id. § 2000bb-l(bXl), (2).
29. Id. §§ 2000bb-3, 2000bb-4.
30. Neuman, supra note 21, at 39.
31. Sasnett v. Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995)
(remedial), affd sub noma Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996); Belgard v.
Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. Haw. 1995) (substantive); Abordo v. Hawaii, 902 F. Supp.
1220 (D. Haw. 1995) (ambiguous as to remedial or substantive rationale).
32. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996); Flores v. City of
Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Supreme Court's definition of congressional powers under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." 3 The enforcement power of Congress under
the Clause has been defined by the Supreme Court since the Amendment's ratification in 1866.
Perhaps the most important early decision construing the breadth of
congressional power under Section Five came in the Civil Rights
Cases," which set the tone for defining the reach of the Enforcement
Clause. In these decisions, the Court declared void sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 that prescribed criminal sanctions for denying to any
person the enjoyment of public accommodations.' The majority noted
that the Amendment's entire purpose was to prohibit state action;
individual invasion of individual rights was not the subject matter of the
amendment." The Court concluded that the Enforcement Clause vests
Congress with the power to enforce prohibitions against certain state
actions.37 In the majority's view, congressional Enforcement Clause
power was limited to the enactment of corrective legislation. The Clause
did not endow Congress with the "power to legislate upon subjects which
are within the domain of State legislation."' The Fourteenth Amendment provides "modes of relief against State legislation, or State
action."3 9
In addition to the Civil Rights Cases, several other early decisions
reflect the Supreme Court's construction of Congress's enforcement
power in connection with particular actions of the states. For example,
in United States v. Reese,' the Court stated that although Congress
has the authority to regulate federal elections, such regulations are
inapplicable to state elections and exceed the scope of the Enforcement
Clause.41
42 the Court declared unconstitutional a
In United States v. Harris,
federal statute that imposed criminal punishment upon two or more
persons in any state who conspired to deprive another of equal

33. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
ld. at 25.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
92 U.S. 214 (1875).
Id. at 220-22.
106 U.S. 629 (1883).
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protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities. 4 ' The
Court was concerned about congressional intrusion into areas traditionally reserved to the states and held that when a state has not violated
Fourteenth Amendment provisions, the Amendment "imposes no duty
and confers no power upon Congress."
Similarly, in James v. Bowman, 4 the Court struck down a federal
statute4 preventing anyone from hindering or intimidating persons
from exercising their rights to suffrage under the Fifteenth Amendment.47 Reading the Fifteenth Amendment as parallel with the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that a statute which purports
to punish purely individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate
Citing previously decided case
exercise of congressional power.4"
law,4' the Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment is in place only
to guarantee that a state does not deny individuals the rights with
which they are endowed.' "The power of the federal government is
limited to the enforcement of this guarantee." Although the specific
holdings of these cases may have been superseded or modified,52 their
treatment of Congress's Section Five power has remained intact.5 s
Modern Enforcement Clause jurisprudence generally defines Congress's Section Five powers as remedial: a means for correcting
unconstitutional state action. While the earlier cases addressing
Congress's enforcement power resulted in frequent disapproval of
legislative schemes, more recent decisions have reflected the necessity
of remedial action taken by the federal government. For example, in
South Carolinav. Katzenbach," the Court upheld certain provisions of

43.

Id. at 644.

44. Id. at 629. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that
the power of Congress to guarantee protection against the acts of state governments

through appropriate legislation does not extend to the passage of laws for the suppression
of crime within the states); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (holding that the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have reference to state action exclusively, and
not to any action of private individuals).

45. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
46. Revised Statutes of the United States, § 5507.
47. 190 U.S. at 142; U.S. CONST.amend. XV.

48, 190 U.S. at 139.
49. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13; Harris,106 U.S. at 639; Rives, 100 U.S. at 318;
Reese, 93 U.S. at 217; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.

50.
51.
52.
States
53.
54.

190 U.S. at 136-38.
Id. at 137 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2166.
383 U.S. 301 (1966).

1998]

CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES

the Voting Rights Act of 1965 against constitutional challenge." The
Court in Katzenbach noted that the Voting Rights Act "reflects Congress'
firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.""
The heart of the Act, as determined by the Court, consisted of a complex
scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination had been most flagrant.6 7 South Carolina challenged the Act on
the ground that it exceeded the powers of Congress and encroached on
an area reserved to the States.58 The majority rejected this argument
and held that Congress had full remedial powers to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting. 59 The
Court ascertained that the very design of the Voting Rights Act was
preventive and remedial in nature, enacted to "banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting."'
In Katzenbach u. Morgan,61 the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.62 That
law provided that no person who had successfully completed the sixth
grade in primary school in, or a private school accredited by, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in which the language of instruction was
not English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of
an inability to read or write English.' The New York state election
laws required an ability to read and write English as a condition of
voting. 4 The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the
judiciary must first determine that the state law is prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment before Congress can pass appropriate enforcement legislation." The Court determined that such a construction
"would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional
responsibility for implementing the Amendment."

55. Id. at 308. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e) (1994). "The Voting Rights Act was
The Act
designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting ....
create[d] stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where it persist(ed] on a
pervasive scale, and in addition the statute strengthen[ed] existing remedies for pockets
of voting discrimination elsewhere in the country.' 383 U.S. at 308.
56. 383 U.S. at 315.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 323.
59. Id. at 326. The Court in Katzenbach upheld the Voting Rights Act as an effective
remedy under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 308.
60. Id. at 308.
61. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
62. I& at 643.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 644.
65. Id. at 648.
66. 1d
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The Court in Morgan stressed the practical effect of Section 4(e). The
law was designed to prohibit New York from denying the right to vote
to large segments of its Puerto Rican community,67 The majority
concluded that it was well within congressional authority to say that the
need of the Puerto Rican community to vote warranted federal intrusion
upon any state interest served by the English literacy requirements.
Therefore, the Court held that Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act was
appropriate legislation, and thus constitutional."
The decision in Morgan arguably conferred upon Congress the
substantive power of determining what constitutes a constitutional right.
This substantive power may be broadly labeled as a tool of Congress
used to expand the rights contained in Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment.70 By stating that the judiciary need not first determine
that the state law is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
majority in Morgan seemed to concurrently exercise its Marbury v.
Madison71 power with Congress. Through Morgan, Congress appeared
to implicitly possess the authority to create a substantive change in the
Constitution. Under this substantive rationale, the Court appeared to
be "committed both to the presumption that facts [may] exist which
sustain congressional legislation and also to deference to72congressional
judgment about questions of degree and proportionality." ,
However, not all modern Section Five jurisprudence has resulted in
judicial approval of legislative schemes. The enforcement power of
Congress was called into question upon the enactment of the 1970
amendments 7 to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 74 a majority of the Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement powers by enacting legislation that lowered the minimum age of
voters from twenty-one to eighteen in state and local elections.75 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart dismissed the respondent's argument
that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress with the
authority to nullify state laws requiring voters to be twenty-one years of
age or older." He agreed with Justice Black that "[uit is a plain fact of

67. Id. at 652.
68. Id. at 653.
69.
70.
71.
72.
HARV.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 658.
See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Archibald Cox, ConstitutionalAdjudicationand the ProtectionofHumanRights, 80
L. REv. 91, 107 (1966).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 bb-1 (1994).
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 293 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress
would set the qualifications for voters in every election from President
to local constable or village alderman."7 Unlike its predecessors of
modem Enforcement Clause jurisprudence, Mitchell invalidated a
portion of federal legislation."'
In light of modem Enforcement Clause jurisprudence, the question of
whether Congress possessed the power to create a substantive change in
the Constitution remained open. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court
closed the door on this debate.

III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held in a six to three
decision that Congress had exceeded its Enforcement Clause power
under the Fourteenth Amendment through the passage of RFRA.79 The
Court struck down the statute as a broad intrusion into the sphere of the
Separation of Powers doctrine.'
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began the opinion with an
explanation of the Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith. In
that case, the Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
religious practices that conflict with "a valid and neutral law of general
applicability."8 ' The Court in Smith refused to apply the Sherbert test
because its application to the facts would have produced "a constitutional
right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability. 2 Justice Kennedy pointed to the observation of the Court in Smith that the only
instances when a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass
constitutional muster were cases in which other constitutional protecWisconsin v. Yoder, for example, involved a
tions were at stake.'
hybrid situation concerning both the free exercise of religion and another
constitutional right. That particular case implicated not only the right
to free exercise of religion, but also the right of parents to control their
children's education." The majority noted Congress's disagreement
with Smith's abandonment of the standard established in Sherbert and
its progeny by observing the purpose of RFRA's passage. 8

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 130.
117 S. Ct. at 2172.
Id.
494 U.S. at 879.
117 S. Ct. at 2161.
Id
Id.
1& at 2161-62.
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To evaluate the city's constitutional challenge of RFRA, the Court
began its analysis with an examination of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In City of Boerne, the City and the Archbishop disagreed
about whether RFRA was a proper exercise of Congress's Section Five
power. The Archbishop contended that RFRA was permissible enforcement legislation, protecting one of the liberties guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause--the free exercise of
religion-beyond what is necessary under Smith." The Supreme Court
disagreed.
The Court acknowledged that Section Five is "'a positive grant of
legislative power.'""7 Legislation that deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall under Congress's enforcement power even if through
enforcement it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.88
Although Congress's Section Five power is broad, it is not unlimited.89
By first examining the text of Section Five in light of the entire
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that Congress's power
under this section extends only to "enforcing" the provisions of the
Amendment." This particular power has been described as remedial. 91 According to the majority, "[tihe design of the Amendment and
the text of [Section Five] are inconsistent with the suggestion that
Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States."9 2 "Congress does not enforce
a constitutional right by changing what the right is." 3 That branch of
government has been given the power to "enforce," not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." From these
principles, Justice Kennedy offered a guideline for discerning the line
between measures that remedy and measures that effectuate substantive
change. "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
The Court noted that without such a connection, legislation
end.'

86. Id. at 2162-63.
87. Id. at 2163 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651).
88. Id. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301 (combating racial discrimination in voting);
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965);

Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (upholding five year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar
requirements for registering to vote).
89. 117 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128).
90. Id. at 2164.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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may become substantive in operation and effect, because it allows
Congress to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."
Before applying these principles to RFRA, Justice Kennedy engaged
in an extensive discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's history to
confirm the remedial nature of the Enforcement Clause. Beginning with
early proposals for the Amendment, Justice Kennedy noted the
opposition to conferring upon Congress the power to "make all laws
necessary and proper" to secure the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the several states."' Through the rejection of this early proposal, the
majority concluded that it was not the intent of the legislature to enable
"Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects," leaving nothing for the
states and "work[ing] an entire change in our form of government."'
The revised draft, which has remained unchanged to date, was met
with approval. The new draft allowed Congress "'to correct the unjust
legislation of the States." 9 In addition, the design of the Amendment
has proved significant, as Justice Kennedy noted, in maintaining the
traditional separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary."'
The Amendment retains in the judiciary the power to interpret the
Constitution.'
According to the majority, the remedial nature of the Enforcement
Clause is confirmed in case law.0 2 The Court pointed to such early
decisions as the Civil Rights Cases and United States v. Reese as
reflective of the notion that any suggestion that Congress was given the
power to "legislate generally upon life, liberty, and property," as opposed
to the remedial power used to combat offensive state action, was
"'repugnant' to the Constitution.""° The majority pointed to the
Court's decisions in Katzenbach, Mitchell, and Morgan to further
demonstrate that a nonremedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is unsupported by case law and that the use of Section Five power
was predicated upon necessity."'
The Court conceded that there is language in Morgan that "could be
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation
that expands the rights contained in Section One of the Fourteenth

96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
98. Id at 2164-65 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1082).
99. Id. at 2165 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sees. at 2286 (statement of Rep.
Stevens)).
100. Id. at 2166.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 15).
104. Id. at 2167.
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Amendment .... [However, this was] not a necessary interpretation...
or even the best one."'
In Morgan, the majority "perceived a factual
basis on which Congress could have concluded that New York's literacy
requirement 'constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the
°
Equal Protection Clause.'"'O
The Court in City of Boerne concluded
that both the substantive and remedial rationales for upholding the
Voting Rights Act rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New
York and Congress's reasonable attempt to combat it."7 "[Ilnterpreting Morgan to give Congress the power to interpret the Constitution
'would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale.'""°
The respondent in City of Boerne argued that RFRA was remedial
legislation because it "prevent[ed] and remed[ied] laws which [were]
enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and
practices."' 9 "If Congress can prohibit laws with discriminatory
effects in order to prevent racial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause," ° then it can do the same, respondent argued, to
promote religious liberty."' The majority conceded that preventive
rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, but there must
exist a congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved.112
The Court suggested that "[tihe appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented."" 3
Pursuant to these principles, Justice Kennedy proceeded with an
instructive comparison of RFRA and the Voting Rights Act. Unlike the
Voting Rights Act, RFRA's legislative record, the Court concluded, "lacks
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed
because of religious bigotry." " 4 The majority held that "RFRA is so
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.""' The "reach and scope" of RFRA distinguished it

105. 1& at 2168.
106. Id. (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656).
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 296).
109. Id. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) ("A law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.").
110. 117 S. Ct. at 2169 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308).
114. Id. The Court noted that the history of religious persecution in the legislative
hearings mentioned no episodes occurring in the past forty years. Id.
115. Id. at 2170.
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16
from other measures passed under Congress's enforcement power."
The legislative enactments examined in Katzenbach, Morgan, and
Mitchell were strictly confined to remedy particular discriminatory

acts. 117 According to the Court, RFRA was not so confined."'

In addition, the Court attacked the high burden placed upon the
government by RFRA. "Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling
interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law."" 9 This stringent test lacks congruence between the means
adopted and the ends to be achieved; "the test would 'open the prospect
of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind.'"' 2 The Court further noted that
RFRA would exact substantial costs through heavy litigation and initiate
the curtailment of traditional state police power.121 "Claims that a law
substantially burdens someone's exercise of religion will often be difficult
to contest."122
Justice Kennedy concluded the majority opinion by demonstrating
RFRA's intrusion into the sphere of separation of powers. The Court
reaffirmed Marbury v. Madison by holding that the courts retain the
power to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the
Constitution."
Because RFRA attempted to initiate a substantive
change in constitutional protections while contradicting "vital principles
necessary to maintain the separation of powers and the federal balance,"
the Court held the statute unconstitutional."2'
Justices Stevens and Scalia filed concurring opinions. Justice Stevens
concluded that RFRA was a "'law respecting an establishment of religion'" that violated the First Amendment and that he would have struck
down the statute for its impermissible "preference for religion." 25
Justice Scalia wrote his concurrence as a response to the claim in Justice
O'Connor's dissent that historical materials support a result contrary to

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2171.

120. Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888).

121.
122.
123.
124
125.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2172.
Id.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. amend, I). Stevens noted that

"[wihether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the statute has
provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain." Id.
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the one reached in Smith. 126 Justice Scalia labeled Justice O'Connor's
claim as "extravagant," suggesting that the "historical evidence
marshalled by the dissent cannot fairly be said to demonstrate the
but it is more supportive of that conclusion than
correctness of Smith;
127
destructive of it."
Three dissents were filed in City of Boerne, the most important of
which belongs to Justice O'Connor. While conceding that the majority
properly framed the issue, Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court had
used an improper "yardstick" for measuring the constitutionality of
She devoted her entire dissent to
RFRA-the holding in Smith.1'
proffering historical evidence that Smith was wrongly decided. Justice
O'Connor would use this case to re-examine the Court's holding in Smith
and direct the parties to brief the question of whether that case
represents the correct understanding of the Free Exercise Clause."2
Justice Souter was not prepared to join the majority in their observance
of the correctness of Smith because he possessed "serious doubts about
the precedential value" of that case's rule."s He would, like Justice
O'Connor, set the case for re-argument, permitting plenary re-examination of the issue.'' Justice Breyer would set the case for re-argument
concerning the correctness of Smith, but did not find it necessary to
consider the question whether Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact RFRA.132
IV

IMPLICATIONS

The effect of the Supreme Court's holding in City of Boerne is twofold.
First, the breadth of Congress's enforcement power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been given a somewhat concise
definition. The majority cleared up any possible dispute over whether
Congress may work a "substantive" change in constitutional protecNo case since Katzenbach u. Morgan has relied upon the
tions."
theory that Congress possesses a substantive alternative on which it
could rely to justify outlawing state governmental practice.'TM The

126. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 2175.
128. Id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 2170. Justice Brennan's opinion in Morgan suggested a "substantive"
alternative by which Congress could find, as a matter of fact or law, that a practice that
the Court had upheld actually violated the Fourteenth Amendment. I&
134. Neuman, supra note 21, at 38.
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Court suggested in City of Boerne that neither legislative history nor
case law confirmed that Congress had such a power, and apparently
rendered this alternative a mere relic.
Further, the Court reaffirmed the Separation of Powers doctrine and
the role of Congress in the federal system, tipping the balance of power
toward the states and the judiciary. 3 The broad and far reaching
scope of RFRA justified its invalidation in the eyes of the statute's
detractors. For example, under RFRA prisoners were able to sue the
states for a variety of religious rights, including special diets, the
violation of dress and hair rules, and even public masturbation.'" A
more graphic example may be found in an occurrence in a Washington,
D.C. prison in 1996. A drug ring pretending to be a church group
smuggled cocaine and prostitutes into the prison and filmed a pornographic movie in the prison chapel."3 7 Perhaps such instances were on
1
the Court's mind when it noted the "substantial costs RFRA exacts." '
The decision in City of Boerne, however, has left many proponents of
RFRA to question the validity of the Court's separation of powers
reasoning. The congruence and proportionality standard promulgated
by the majority has been labeled as inherently vague."' 9 Under this
standard it is little more than guess work to decide which enforcement
legislation is valid and which is not.' 4 To RFRA supporters, facts
about the relative magnitude of societal problems should be legislative
facts, not judicial ones.14'
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the judiciary as the illuminator of
constitutionally protected rights.'
The states should be unencumbered by far reaching limitations on their authority, particularly in the
absence of clear evidence that they have threatened constitutional
guarantees.'
The Court's current position revolving around the
importance of the states' general police power may be surmised through
the labeling of RFRA as "a considerable congressional intrusion into the

135. John Nolon & Helen Maher, RFRA Is Not Needed: New York Land Use
RegulationsAccomodate Religious Use, 218 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1997).
136. Llen Oxman, AG Wants State Religious Liberty Law, 19 NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997,
at As.
137. Id.
138. 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
139. House of Rep. Comm. In the JudiciarySubcommittee on the Court:Subcommittee
Hearing on "ProtectingReligious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores," at 3 (1997) (testimony
of Douglas Laylock, University of Texas Law School).
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Nolon, supra note 135, at 5.
143. Id.
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States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens."'" The Court believes that
congressional enforcement powers under Section Five have real limits-a
point on which all the Justices appear to agree."
Second, the holding in City of Boerne leaves Smith as controlling
authority for interpreting free exercise claims as applied to state
imposed burdens. In Smith, the Court declined to follow the test set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner. The Court in Sherbert held that laws
burdening religious conduct were constitutional only if they bore an
appropriate connection to a compelling government interest.146 Many
interpreters think Sherbert was an important and correct decision and
regret the failure of Smith to follow its lesson. 47 On the other hand,
others see Smith as "an important corrective to the mistaken suggestion
in Sherbert that religious believers are entitled to carve out their own
legal microenvironments to make sufficient space for their religiously
motivated conduct.""
The Smith test has been refined in Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.'49 In that case the Court held that in order for
the Smith standard to be utilized, laws examined must be both neutral
and generally applicable, and "a law failing to satisfy these requirements
must be justified by a compelling government interest and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.""5 As a result of the
Court's decision in City of Boerne, the holding of Smith (and later
refinement by Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye) appears to command
a comfortable six vote majority among the current Justices. 15' That
majority spans the ideological spectrum from Justices Thomas and Scalia
to Justices Stevens and Ginsberg. 2 There are three Justices, however, who are willing to re-examine the holding of Smith. Even though
Smith is controlling, the standard promulgated in that case remains
open for re-evaluation.

144.

117 S. Ct. at 2171.

145. David 0. Stewart, Power Surge, A.B.A.J. 46, 47 (1997).
146. 374 U.S. at 403.
147. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom,
74 TEx. L. REv. 577, 579 (1996).
148. Id. at 579-80. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 309 (1991) (defending "Smith's rejection of
constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions").
149. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
150. Id. at 533.
151. Stewart, supra note 145, at 47.
152. Id.
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The next step belongs to Congress.'
Supporters of RFRA have
vowed to craft a narrower version for passage.1 " Numerous states
have already crafted narrower state law versions of the invalidated
federal statute. If the new federal legislation attempts to work a
substantive change in constitutional protections, it will, in all likelihood,
suffer a fate similar to that of RFRA.
R. BRENT HATCHER, JR.

153. Id
154. Id.

